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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
000O000 
SALT LAKE CITY, : REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. : Case No. 981670-CA 
JENNIFER K. WOOD, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
000O000 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. Salt Lake City, in defending this Ordnance, appears to be 
playing the only card that it has. It is casting the Ordinance as 
something that it is not: an ordinance designed to protect against 
adult entertainment or public indecency. The ordinance is a 
regulation of dancing, without anything more. As such, it is an 
invalidated infringement on constitutional protections. 
II. Defendant has properly identified a state constitutional 
basis for additional protection of her rights to free expression. 
The Utah Supreme Court has previously stated that there are such 
independent protections. Defendant asks that her right to free 
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expression be reviewed in light of those additional constitutional 
protections. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF HAS NOT IDENTIFIED AN IMPORTANT OF SUBSTANTIAL 
INTEREST ADDRESSED BY THIS ORDINANCE. 
Defendant was convicted of dancing without a license, and not 
of any lewd behavior. 
Defendant in this action was convicted solely of dancing 
without a license, in a place in which alcoholic beverages were 
sold. The content of the dancing was not at issue; and 
observations of what particular dancers did or what particular 
dancers wore are not relevant. The question here is whether 
dancing in an establishment which sells alcoholic beverages can be 
regulated and licensed solely because of the presence of the 
alcoholic beverages. This is not an adult entertainment case. 
This ordinance is specifically designed to license dancers who are 
not adult entertainers. As such, the City lacks the power to enact 
this regulation. Plaintiff has sought to justify the regulations 
based on "a line of cases based on California v. LaRue" (Appellee 
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Brief page 9) . This is done despite the overruling of that case by 
44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S.Ct. 1495 (1996). The 
City contends that the reasoning of LaRue continues to allow 
regulation of "dancing of the sort involved in the present matter" 
(id.) . There was no determination in the lower Court of what 
"sort" of dancing was involved. The only thing that was at issue 
was whether there was dancing, and whether there was a license. 
The City's efforts to bolster its ordinance with this authority are 
completely misplaced. 
The City also cites Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 
50 (1976) and Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 
(1986) . In doing so, the City continues to cast its present 
ordinance as "a public indecency statute" (Appellee's Brief page 
11). Unlike all of the other cases cited by Defendant in Points I 
and II of its Brief, this case does not involve the type of adult 
entertainment which has been regulated under the test set forth in 
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The City has 
articulated no reason for the current ordinance which is "unrelated 
to the suppression of free expression," as required by the O'Brien 
test. The attempts to claim that this is an adult entertainment 
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case in which "secondary effects" is regulated, have no merit. 
Neither is this an exercise of the "authority to provide for the 
public health, safety, and morals." This ordinance regulates 
expression, and only expression. The ordinance differentiates 
between the type of entertainment regulated and that which is not 
regulated, solely on the basis of whether alcohol is present. That 
is exactly what 44 Liquormart prohibits. It is also the type of 
"blanket restriction" on expression prohibited by Reno v. American 
Civil Liberties Union, 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1996). The only way that 
the City can hope to prevail is to convince this Court that this 
case is something that it is not. Salt Lake City has separately 
regulated adult entertainment and public indecency. If this were 
an attempt to regulate public indecency, in a manner similar to 
Renton, it might have some validity. It is not such an ordinance. 
Plaintiff obviously fails to identify any compelling interest that 
the City has in this ordinance. The City likewise fails to 
identify an important of substantial governmental interest, 
pursuant to the Renton test. 
Defendant quotes, in two places, Dodgers Bar & Grill, Inc. v. 
Johnson County Board of County Commissioners, 32 F.3d 1436 (10th 
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Cir. 1994) for the proposition that the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals has upheld regulations such as this. The reference to 
Dodgers Grill is inappropriate in two respects. First, that case 
was based on California v. LaRue. which has been repudiated by the 
United States Supreme Court. Secondly, it was a case directly 
involving adult entertainment and the requirement that dancers 
"wear a g-string and pasties" (Appellee's Brief page 15). This is 
not a case in which dancers are legitimately required to maintain 
certain standards of decency. This is only a case in which 
licenses are required for the very act of dancing. Plaintiff has 
made no attempt to differentiate between the conduct which is 
licensed in establishments serving alcohol, and the exact same 
conduct which is allowed without a license, in establishments which 
do not serve alcohol. Their failure to differentiate renders this 
ordinance unconstitutional. The City has tried to obscure the 
obvious issue here by stating that at least one dancer was employed 
as a nude or semi-nude dancer in an adjacent city (Appellee's Brief 
page 3). Once again, this is not an ordinance designed at specific 
conduct which might be properly regulated by the City. It is an 
5 
severe overbreadth which requires this Court to strike this law as 
unconstitutional. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF HAS PROVIDED A PROPER BASIS FOR USING THE UTAH STATE 
CONSTITUTION TO GRANT HER RELIEF. 
Plaintiff suggests that Defendant has not properly presented 
her right to claim relief under the Constitution of the State of 
Utah. Defendant believes she has fully briefed the issue, with 
what law is available in the State of Utah. 
Plaintiff dismisses the ruling of this Court in West v. 
Thompson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999 (Utah 1994) in which this court 
stated that there is an independent protection in the Utah 
Constitution for expressive freedoms. This provision, like that of 
the First Amendment, was drafted to protect minority viewpoints 
from the oppressive power of majority disfavor, using the power of 
government. 
It is perhaps instructive to look at actions of the Utah 
Supreme Court regarding other important an fundamental right 
guaranteed by both Constitutions. The United States Supreme Court, 
in the case of United States v. Miller. 425 U.S. 435 (1976) held 
that a depositor of a financial institution has no legitimate 
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expectation of privacy in his bank records, and consequently has no 
standing under the Fourth Amendment to challenge their seizure. 
The Supreme Court of Utah, however, found that Article I Section 14 
of the Constitution of Utah does indeed protect personal records, 
in the case of State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991). The 
Supreme Court held: 
We hold that under article I section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution, defendants under the facts of this case had 
a right to be secure against unreasonable searches and 
seizures of their bank statements, "checks, savings, 
bonds, loan applications, loan guarantees, and all papers 
which [they] supplied to the bank to facilitate the 
conduct [their] financial affairs upon the reasonable 
assumption that the information would remain 
confidential." 810 P.2d at 418. 
This Court did not base its holding in that case on either the 
text of the Constitutional provisions, or its history. Both 
provisions protect individuals from "unreasonable" intrusions of 
government officials. This Court made a determination that the 
intrusions of governmental officials in seizing documents from 
banks were not reasonable. The United States Supreme Court has 
been unwilling to make the same determination. Thankfully, 
citizens of this State have an added protection against a practise 
that really is not reasonable. Plaintiff asks this Court to make 
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the same kind of determination here. Other courts have found 
sufficient authority in constitutional law to protect expression in 
this manner; and it is a freedom that is under attack based solely 
on the content of the message conveyed. 
Likewise, the United States Supreme Court declined, in Bowers 
v. Hardwick. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), a case out of the State of 
Georgia, to extend the constitutional right to privacy to 
consensual homosexual acts. It took another 12 years for the 
Georgia Supreme Court to declare that such a right exists under the 
Georgia Constitution; but it did so in November, 1998, in the case 
of Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, (Ga. 1998). Once again, it is 
not textual differences in the constitutions which have been relied 
upon; but instead a determination by the State's highest court that 
the government has no legitimate interest in regulating certain 
aspects of intimate relations. Defendant believes that the City of 
Salt Lake has gone beyond its legitimate functions in the 
regulations it has applied to her; and this Court should so find. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff fails in its efforts to identify valid interests 
which it is seeking to protect in the instant ordinance. It 
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attempts to shift the focus to matters which are not at issue, to 
hide its inability to identify those interests. Defendant is 
protected by both Federal and State Constitutions from this 
attempt to abridge her freedom of expression, 
DATED this day of May, 1999 
W. Andrew McCullougm 
Attorney for Appellant 
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